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The paper examines the development of wage inequality in Hungary between 
1994 and 2016, based on the theories that explain the labour market impact of 
information and communication technologies (ICT). The analysis is based on the 
Hungarian Wage Survey Database and uses the empirical methods in the literature 
to calculate the change of the employment shares and wages of various jobs. As 
in most countries, the Hungarian labour market became polarized, but this has 
not been accompanied with wage polarization. Rather, the increase of wages was 
inversely proportional with skill. The paper proposes two reasons for this behaviour: 
one is the large increase in the minimum wage, while the other the educational 
expansion which increased the labour supply of highly skilled workers. 
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“Labor will become less and less important... More and more workers will be 
replaced by machines. I do not see that new industries can employ everybody 
who wants a job.” (Wassily Leontief1)
1. Introduction
Even though the Nobel laureate economist Leontief’s prediction regarding the 
labour market took thirty years to materialise, something changed on the labour 
market in the early 1980s, and wage inequality started growing in most advanced 
countries. It was first documented in the US that between 1980 and 2009 high-
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org/papers/w23285.pdf
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wage workers’ earnings increased much more than that of medium- and low-
wage workers. The difference between the most highly skilled and the least skilled 
workers was dramatic: while the real wages of college or university graduates grew 
by around 60 per cent, those without a high school diploma saw a decrease in 
their wages in real terms (Acemoglu – Autor 2011). This surprised researchers and 
policymakers because inequality had been on the decline for a long time before 
that. Goldin and Katz (2008) use long time series to document that wage inequality 
in the United States exhibited a downward trend between the early 20th century 
and the 1970s. Wage inequality rose not only in the United States. Katz and Autor 
(1999) document the wage differences between low- and high-wage workers in 
16 developed countries and conclude that inequality has mostly increased, although 
much less than measured in the United States.
An analysis of the changes in the past 30 years by occupation shows that there is 
a more complicated relationship between qualifications and wage growth than 
a simple linear correlation. Researchers have shown in several countries that the 
occupations that were in the upper or lower segment of the wage distribution in 
1980 based on their average wage enjoyed much larger wage growth until 2005 than 
medium-wage occupations.2 In parallel with the change in wages, the employment 
share of occupations also changed: high- or low-skilled jobs are increasingly present 
on the labour market, while the share of jobs that are traditionally performed by 
medium-skilled workers are on the decline.
This paper presents the theories that provide the most likely explanation for this 
major change. These attribute this significant reallocation on the labour market 
to the impact of information and communications technologies (ICT). The second 
half of the study documents the trends in wage inequality in Hungary during the 
previous two decades. This analysis is based on the Wage Survey Database that 
contains annual information from the early 1990s up until 2016 on the occupation, 
wage and other demographic features of Hungarian employees. Empirical methods 
from the literature are used to calculate how wages have changed across the various 
qualification and employment groups and document the increasing prominence or 
diminishing weight of employment groups on the labour market.
The results indicate that there are substantial differences in terms of labour market 
developments between the first half of the 1990s and the subsequent period. In the 
1990s, high wages increased more than medium and low wages, and the share of 
high-skilled workers on the labour market dropped, probably due to the insufficient 
supply of graduate workers. By contrast, in the 2000s, labour market polarisation 
emerged: the proportion of the occupations with an average wage declined relative 
2  See the paper by Autor and Dorn (2013) on the United States, Goos et al. (2009) on 16 European countries 
and the World Bank (2016) on several developing countries.
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to those with low and high wages. However, wages did not follow this trend, as 
the wage growth of occupations was inversely proportional to the initial wage level 
since the early 2000s. Therefore, wage inequality increased between 1994 and 
2000, but there was a turnaround at the turn of the century, and inequality started 
to decrease. According to the calculations, in 2015 the wage difference between 
college or university graduates and those with at most a secondary school diploma 
was the same as in 1994.
Two changes can explain the drop in wage inequality. One is the minimum wage, 
which was substantially increased in 2001 and 2012, and boosted low wages. 
The second is the expansion in higher education, which bore fruit in 2000 and 
considerably increased the proportion of university and college graduates on 
the labour market. The first phenomenon raised low wages, while the second 
moderated the rise of high wages.
The next chapter presents the theories that explain the impact of ICT on the labour 
market. Chapter 3 describes the database, and Chapter 4 details the analysis. 
Chapter 5 then attempts to provide some explanations as to why Hungary has 
different wage dynamics than the advanced economies. The analysis ends with 
a summary of the results.
2. Theoretical framework
Economic theory needs to explain two interrelated phenomena. Data from 
developed countries show that wage inequality started increasing in the 1980s 
such that better educated workers received larger premia. Later, typically in the 
1990s, the labour market became polarised, i.e. the relative size and wages of 
both high- and low-paying occupations increased at a higher rate than of average-
paying jobs. This chapter outlines the two theories that provide a simple market 
explanation for the two labour market developments.
2.1. Tinbergen’s race between education and technology3
Wage changes are usually addressed in terms of employees’ educational attainment 
on the basis of Tinbergen’s (1974) model, which was first used by Katz and Murphy 
(1992) to explain the changes that took place in the 1980s. The model distinguishes 
two types of workers: the unskilled (those with at most a secondary school diploma) 
and the skilled (college or university graduates). The wage difference between the 
skilled and the unskilled is explained by the relative supply and demand of the 
two categories. The key assumption is that the two types of workers are imperfect 
substitutes in the production process. This is not an unrealistic hypothesis. High-
skilled and low-skilled employees are employed together in firms, and at the level 
3  This chapter is based on a paper by Acemoglu and Autor (2011).
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of the national economy a high-skilled employee needs various products and 
services for work, which are provided by secondary school graduates. Production 
is described by a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function, where 
the two factors are the amounts of skilled and unskilled labour:
 Y = [(A1N1)
(σ–1)/σ + (A2N2)
(σ–1)/σ] σ/(σ–1). (1)
In the expression above, the number of skilled (unskilled) workers is N1 (N2). A1 and 
A2 are technological parameters influencing the productivity of the factors, and σ is 
the elasticity of substitution between the two types of workers measuring how the 
change in relative wages influences the relative demand for the factors.
The wage premium of skilled workers rises if a technology is introduced that 
increases graduate employees’ productivity (e.g. a computer will make a designer 
much more efficient than a machine operator). It will do so because the new 
technology and skilled employees are complements in the production process, 
therefore the productivity of skilled workers (A1) increases (relative to the unskilled). 
This relative wage growth expands the graduate wage premium. Assuming that 
workers’ wage equals their marginal product, the derivative of Expression (1) with 
respect to N1 and N2 yields the following relative wage equation: 
 log(w1/w2) = (σ–1)/σ log(A1/A2) – 1/σ log(N1/N2). (2)
In Expression (2), two factors influence the relative wage. The first is technology: if, 
for example, A1 is greater than A2, technology increases the productivity of skilled 
workers more than in the case of the unskilled. This boosts companies’ demand 
for skilled workers, which lifts relative wages if σ > 1 (i.e. skilled and the unskilled 
workers are imperfect substitutes). From the supply side, the relative number of 
graduate workers decreases the wage premium, and the elasticity between relative 
wages and the relative number of workers equals the inverse of the elasticity of 
substitution. This generates the race between education and technological change. 
Educational expansion decreases, while advances in technology increase the wage 
difference between the skilled and the unskilled. If an economy is characterised by 
an expansion in higher education (as was the case in developed countries and the 
whole of Europe), the supply of graduate employees increases, which in turn hinders 
their wage growth. It follows from this that if production processes had remained 
unchanged, the steady increase in the supply of high-skilled employees should have 
caused the university wage premium to fall. As the very opposite happened, it is 
likely that technological change triggered far more substantial changes on the labour 
market in favour of skilled workers than what could have been counterbalanced by 
the expansion in higher education.
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2.2. Labour market polarisation
The model discussed in the previous subchapter uses simple changes in supply 
and demand to provide an explanation for the increased wage inequality in the 
past decades and gives good predictions for the changes that occurred on the 
labour markets of developed countries in the 1980s. However, it cannot explain 
the labour market polarisation that has been happening since the 1990s, i.e. that 
occupations requiring average skills (typically jobs for factory workers) are losing 
ground to the occupations that involve low skills (mostly jobs in services performed 
by workers with at most a secondary school diploma) or high skills (which usually 
require a college or university degree).
Autor and Dorn (2013) supplement Tinbergen’s theory to interpret labour market 
polarisation. To do so, they classify labour not only by skills but also by the type 
of tasks workers perform. The previous model’s skilled–unskilled categorisation is 
expanded by dividing unskilled workers into two groups by the nature of their jobs, 
i.e. based on the amount of their routine tasks. In this context, a “routine task” 
will not be defined as one that is easy to carry out, but as one that can be broken 
down into steps that always need to be carried out in the same way and is repeated 
over time. The tasks of a factory worker recur often; similarly, an accountant’s 
work is also repetitive and bound by well-defined rules. By contrast, a hairdresser 
or a cleaner (and many other people working in the service sector) encounter 
a different situation each time, although their work requires less expertise than 
that of a factory worker or an accountant. The tasks performed by such workers 
require either complex communication skills (e.g. in the case of a hairdresser or 
a beautician), or the recognition of complex, constantly changing patterns (e.g. 
a cleaner cleans rooms of various shapes and furniture). Those working in the 
service sector are generally found at the bottom of wage distribution, those in 
occupations comprising routine tasks in the middle, and graduate employees at 
the top.
Labour market changes are once again triggered by the impact of technology. Jobs 
requiring a degree are generally made more efficient as a result of ICT because they 
complement it in production: rapid communication and huge databases increase 
the efficiency of the work of managers, engineers and analysts. As ICT can perform 
repetitive routine tasks that are subject to rules, it can substitute routine workers 
and so the share of occupations carrying out such tasks is decreasing as ICT is 
becoming increasingly cheap. The tasks of those in the service sector are usually 
impossible to robotise, or only at a high cost. ICT has only recently become able to 
engage in effective communication and identify complex patterns (Brynjolfsson – 
McAfee 2014), therefore the productivity of low-skilled workers in services has not 
been affected directly by the introduction of ICT, and thus the new technology has 
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also had no direct impact on their wages.4 However, these workers are not shielded 
from indirect labour market consequences. Since the people carrying out routine 
tasks are increasingly losing their jobs and are not skilled enough for graduate 
jobs, they also look for jobs in the lower segment of the labour market, thereby 
competing with employees who have already been providing services. However, this 
effect is counterbalanced by the increased demand for services, which is generated 
by high graduate wages and the fact that the prices of some products are falling (as 
they can be produced cheaper with ICT). Some of the additional income is spent 
on the services market, which produces a scale effect, increasing the demand for 
unskilled workers.
To summarize, two developments result from the spread of ICT. Robots are 
crowding out medium-skilled workers carrying out routine tasks (who tend to work 
in manufacturing or offices). In turn, increased productivity generates additional 
income, boosting demand for services and, consequently, the labour demand for 
the employees who provide those services. As the wages of skilled labour increase 
(since their skills complement the new technology well), the labour market becomes 
polarised: demand for both high-skilled and low-skilled workers increases, which 
entails a rise in their wages. By contrast, the share of employees carrying out routine 
tasks in the middle of the wage distribution decreases on the labour market, which 
also affects their wages.
2.3. Alternative explanations
Besides the spread of ICT, there are alternative explanations for the large increase 
in wage inequality. According to one, the answer lies in the changes to the labour 
market’s institutional system. The clout of two major labour market institutions 
protecting workers in the United States has diminished: the minimum wage 
plunged, and the role of trade unions has weakened (Card – DiNardo 2002). These 
institutions could be truly important in the convergence of low wages; therefore, 
they may influence wage distribution. However, the labour market institutions have 
not changed in all countries, but wage inequality has grown everywhere. 
The other explanation is the growing volume of trade between developing and 
developed countries, which triggers similar mechanisms in wage setting, i.e. it 
poaches the jobs from medium-skilled factory workers, and their wages become 
4  This will not be the case in the future because ICT will increasingly filter into the service market (see, for 
example, the rise of self-driving cars in recent years). ICT is likely to transform the whole labour market in 
the near future, and it is unclear how this realignment will end. Depending on the assumptions, there are 
different estimates about the percentage of jobs performed by robots in the future. The World Bank puts 
this figure at 57 per cent in 20 years (World Bank 2016), while Arntz et al. (2016) believe it to be merely 
9 per cent.
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lower as a result of the drop in demand.5 However, Baldwin (2016) shows that this 
could not have taken place without advanced communication technologies. In other 
words, globalisation is also being driven by technological change. Moreover, the 
share of medium-skilled workers also decreased in relative terms on the labour 
markets of developing, heavily exporting countries (World Bank 2016).
3. Data
This paper uses the Wage Survey Database compiled by the Hungarian National 
Employment Office. The analysis only considers the wages of employees in firms, 
because public sector wages are not directly determined by labour market supply 
and demand. The database provides information on the age, gender, educational 
attainment, occupation and wages of corporate employees. The analysis covers the 
period between 1994 and 2016,6 and the sample includes businesses employing at 
least 20 people.7 The companies had to complete the survey for blue collar workers 
born on the 5th and 15th, and for white collar workers born on the 5th, 15th and 
25th of any month. If nobody at the company was born on these dates, the firm was 
dropped from the sample for the given year. In 2002, the threshold under which 
companies had to provide data for all their workers was raised to 50. Since 2011, 
workers in a public work scheme can be distinguished in the database. As their 
wage is regulated by law, they are not included in the analysis.
The database provides information on the total number of blue and white collar 
workers at the company level, which was used to produce weights in order to offset 
the sampling differences between blue and which collar workers within the firm.
Wage is measured by the monthly wage paid in May, which includes the base 
salary, overtime pay, other regular pay (e.g. language allowance, management 
allowance) but does not include non-regular income. This item is measured by 
1/12th of the non-regular pay from the previous year and is added to the wages in 
May. Nominal wages are deflated with the consumer price index. The occupations 
are reported based on the Hungarian Standard Classification of Occupations (FEOR), 
which follows the ISCO categorisation developed by the International Labour 
Organization.8 The analysis uses 3-digit ISCO groups.
5  Autor et al. (2013) find that in the US manufacturing employment has fallen to a greater extent in regions 
that were exposed to Chinese imports, and that the competition created by foreign trade is responsible for 
a quarter of the redundancies in manufacturing.
6  Although the data are available since 1992, the first two years are not used because it would be very difficult 
to separate the effects of labour market liberalisation and the new technologies in the first turbulent years 
of the economic transition.
7  In 1998, the database was supplemented with a random sample of smaller enterprises, but they are not 
included in this analysis to eliminate the effects of sample change.
8  The classification of occupations changed in 2011, and the analysis harmonises the FEOR-93 (ISCO-88) and 
the FEOR-08 (ISCO-08) classification systems.
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Table 1 shows the number of observations as well as the total population (which 
consists of the weighted sum of the sample). In the 1990s, the data have information 
on about 90,000–100,000 workers. In the 2000s, this figure increases to 110,000–
130,000, or even higher (150,000–165,000) in certain years. Weighted figures are 
more stable at 1.2 million workers, with the exception of the first two years of the 
analysis, where the weighted number of elements is around 1.6 million.
Table 1
Number of observations
Year Sample Population
1994 110,839 1,614,968
1995 109,885 1,583,435
1996 92,334 1,269,581
1997 91,422 1,229,928
1998 90,915 1,224,671
1999 89,044 1,169,112
2000 95,003 1,183,126
2001 91,224 1,108,623
2002 108,273 1,225,899
2003 112,525 1,213,671
2004 124,797 1,252,526
2005 132,884 1,257,645
2006 154,610 1,415,760
2007 132,412 1,251,285
2008 137,527 1,237,964
2009 129,569 1,223,417
2010 132,488 1,257,558
2011 119,460 1,208,077
2012 135,791 1,199,017
2013 126,907 1,199,639
2014 130,106 1,190,233
2015 165,768 1,164,694
2016 143,654 1,235,613
Note: The table shows the weighted and the unweighted number of elements in the sample. Population: 
the individuals employed by companies with at least 20 workers and using double-entry bookkeeping.
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4. The evolution of wages and wage inequality in Hungary
Now we turn to the examination of the Hungarian labour market and show how 
wages changed in the past 20 years. First, we present the dynamics of wages and 
then we turn to testing whether the labour market has become polarised in Hungary 
as elsewhere. The end of the chapter seeks to provide answers to the phenomena 
described below.
4.1. Wage dynamics, 1994–2016
Figure 1 shows the annual growth rate of wages for three skill groups (those without 
a secondary school diploma, secondary school graduates and college and university 
graduates).9 In the period studied, the wages of the low- and high-skilled increased 
at a similar pace, while those of the medium-skilled somewhat lagged behind. Wages 
increased steadily between 1995 and 2007, then stagnated for quite a few years on 
account of the crisis, and started growing again in the last years of the period. The 
wage advantage of university graduates was achieved until 2000. The wage growth 
was similar in the other two educational groups until 2009 when the wages of the 
low-skilled became persistently higher than those with a high school diploma.
9  Wages are logged and their growth is measured with log difference.
Figure 1
Changes in earnings by educational attainment
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Note: N = 2,757,663. The figure shows the change of log income relative to 1994 for workers with less 
than high school, high school and university education. Nominal income is deflated with the consumer 
price index.
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To summarise the development of wage differentials of workers with various levels 
of educational attainment, Figure 2 presents the difference in average earnings 
by educational attainment. One line shows the wage premium of college and 
university graduates relative to secondary school graduates, while the other shows 
the difference between secondary school graduates and unskilled workers. The 
university wage premium increases sharply in the first six years of the analysis and 
then falls or stagnates in the subsequent period. The high school wage premium 
shows no substantial change in the first half of the period studied and then follows 
a steady downward trend from 2009.
Not all university graduates perform high-skilled work, and not all low-skilled 
workers earn low wages. To obtain a more detailed understanding of the 
development of low, average and high wages in Hungary, workers are not classified 
based on their educational attainment but instead the wages of those in the 10th, 
50th and 90th percentile of the wage distribution are tracked. Figure 3 paints 
a slightly different picture of wage inequality than the wage differences between 
the education groups. The highest wages start diverging from average and low 
wages at the start of the period, and maintain their advantage until 2012. Average 
wages follow a similar path, but their annual growth rate is lower than in the case 
of high wages. Low wages first drop and then gradually rise, and over the whole 
period have the same growth as high wages.
Figure 2
Ratio of wages by educational attainment
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Note: N = 2,757,663. The figure shows the log wage difference between university graduates and high 
school graduates, and high school graduates and those with less than high school.
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Note that the wages here are gross figures, and, of course, net wage dynamics 
depend not only on wage levels but also on changes in the tax rates. In 2011, the 
rate of the personal income tax was changed, turning it from a progressive tax 
of 17 per cent for income of up to HUF 5 million and 32 per cent above that into 
a flat-rate 16-per cent tax. At the same time, the tax credit for low earners was 
phased out, thereby increasing the tax burden on their wages. The government 
also introduced the child tax allowance, which partly or completely offset the 
increased tax burden for low earners with children.10 As a result of the tax changes, 
the tax burden of low earners increased in general, while that of high earners 
clearly dropped.11 The steep rise in low wages at the end of the period may also 
partly reflect these changes. Because the net wages of high-wage workers grew 
substantially even if employers did not raise gross wages, employers probably 
mainly raised the wages of low earners where net wages declined.
10  In 2011, the average monthly income was HUF 213,094, with a tax burden of HUF 32,000. The tax allowance 
was HUF 10,000 per child for one or two children and HUF 33,000 per child for three children.
11  For the extent and effects of the tax changes, see Szoboszlai et al. (2018).
Figure 3
Changes in wages at the 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles
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Note: N = 2,757,663. The figure shows the change of log wages relative to 1994 for the 10th, 50th and 
90th percentile of the wage distribution. Nominal income is deflated with the consumer price index.
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4.2. Labour market polarisation
The previous chapter analysed wage changes by worker categories. Now we turn to 
how much wages and employment shares changed by occupations. In line with the 
literature (for example Autor – Dorn 2013), occupation categories are created by 
3-digit ISCO codes. Approximately one hundred different occupations are used that 
had the same code in 1994 and 2016.12 Figure 4 displays the occupations arranged 
by the median wage in 1994 (horizontal axis), while the vertical axis shows the share 
of the given occupation within total employment and its median income growth 
between 1994 and 2016.13 The figure shows that polarisation has also taken place 
on the Hungarian labour market. With respect to both the occupation shares and 
wages, medium-skilled workers lag the furthest behind, while the low- and high-
skilled increased their proportion as well as their wage advantage. In contrast to 
the United States, in Hungary the largest wage growth can be observed in the case 
of low-skilled labour.
The dynamics of the average wages shown in Figures 1–3 imply a change in the 
behaviour of the Hungarian labour market around 2000. Between 1994 and 2000, 
wage inequality increased (with high-earning employees earning even more and 
low-earners increasingly falling behind), whereas wage inequality decreased over 
the next 15 years, with wages of low earners catching up. We break down the period 
studied into two phases, and take a closer look at what happened on the labour 
market. Figures 5 and 6 show the changes in employment shares and wage growth 
for the 1990s (1994–2000) and the 2000s (2000–2016).
In the 1990s, the share of the low-skilled increased the most while the proportion 
of the high-skilled declined (Figure 5), and therefore labour market polarisation 
was not observed. Wages became polarised to the extent that in the lowest-paying 
occupations wages rose at a slightly higher rate than around the 20th percentile; 
nevertheless, the most important phenomenon was that wages started increasing 
linearly from the 20th percentile upwards, proportional to the initial wage.14 This 
behaviour is similar to the period between 1980 and 1990 in the United States when 
income increased linearly with education (Katz – Murphy 1992, Autor et al. 2006). 
This is described in the Tinbergen model, which was presented in the section 2.1.
12  Examples of such occupations are “heads of production units”, “financial and accounting professions”, 
“food industry occupations”, “cleaners”.
13  The figure was prepared using locally weighted regression.
14  Kertesi and Köllő (2002) reach similar conclusions with respect to wage growth in the 1990s.
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Figure 4
Change in employment shares and wages, 1994–2016
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Note: N = 2,757,663. The upper panel shows the change in the share of occupations in total employment 
between 1994 and 2016, as a function of where the average median wage of the occupations fell within 
the 1994 wage distribution. The lower panel shows the average wage growth of occupations between 
1994 and 2016, as a function of where the average median wage of the occupations fell within the 1994 
wage distribution. Occupations are defined at the level of 3-digit ISCO codes. Log wages are used. The 
figure was prepared using locally weighted regression.
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Figure 5
Change in employment shares and wages, 1994–2000
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Note: N = 2,757,663. The upper panel shows the change in the share of occupations in total employment 
between 1994 and 2000, as a function of where the average median wage of the occupations fell within 
the 1994 wage distribution. The lower panel shows the average wage growth of occupations between 
1994 and 2000, as a function of where the average median wage of the occupations fell within the 1994 
wage distribution. Occupations are defined at the level of 3-digit ISCO codes. Log wages are used. The 
figure was prepared using locally weighted regression.
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One surprising aspect in the figure is that the share of the high-skilled workers 
declines while their wages increase. Commander and Köllő (2008) examine the 
period 1997–2000 and find that the proportion of the low-skilled drops. If Figure 5 
were prepared for this period, it would yield similar results. Therefore, the low-
skilled gained prominence before 1997, and a likely explanation for this can be 
found in business cycles. According to Nagy (2000), the unemployment rate peaked 
in 1993 (at 11.9 per cent). It steadily decreased over the subsequent years, standing 
at merely 7 per cent in 1999. However, the average unemployment rate conceals 
huge differences in terms of educational attainment. For the high-skilled, it was 
very low in 1993 (for example for males it was 3 per cent), and it declined by only 
1.3 percentage points. By contrast, it tumbled from 15 per cent to 8.3 per cent 
for those with vocational training. The economic crisis that emerged in the early 
1990s, just like the subsequent recovery, affected the chances of the low-skilled 
on the labour market much more, and Figure 5 presumably reflects this. The high-
skilled enjoyed almost full employment even at the trough of the business cycle, 
and growth for this group was probably halted by their supply: much more high-
skilled workers were needed during the recovery than there were in Hungary, and 
the intense demand for such experts boosted their wages. However, there were 
many unemployed among low-skilled workers who could be employed without 
significantly increasing their wages.
Between 2000 and 2016, the wage and employment shares changed by occupation 
very differently than in the 1990s (Figure 6): the labour market became highly 
polarised, i.e. the share of both low- and high-skilled jobs increased dramatically 
at the expense of average earners. However, the behaviour of wages was 
completely different from that seen in the US, because their growth rate was 
inversely proportional to initial wages. The lower the initial wage, the higher the 
wage growth.15 Therefore the Hungarian labour market became polarised without 
the polarisation of wages, and inequality declined at the same time.16 The next 
subchapter seeks to provide an explanation for this behaviour.
15  Underdeclared work may paint a more varied picture, as with that employees are officially paid the minimum 
wage while in reality their earnings are higher. Since the minimum wage was low at the beginning of the 
period, the income of low-earning employees is likely to have grown less in the period relative to high-skilled 
and high-earning employees, who were not affected, even indirectly, by changes in the minimum wage.
16  One possible issue might be that the Great Recession was in the middle of the period under review, and 
Figure 6 may reflect the effects of that. Nevertheless, this is not very likely. Köllő (2011) analyses the short-
term impact of the crisis and finds that it did not affect inequality much.
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Figure 6
Change in employment shares and wages, 2000–2016
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Note: N = 2,757,663. The upper panel shows the change in the share of occupations in total employment 
between 2000 and 2016, as a function of where the average median wage of the occupations fell within 
the 2000 wage distribution. The lower panel shows the average wage growth of occupations between 
2000 and 2016, as a function of where the average median wage of the occupations fell within the 2000 
wage distribution. Occupations are defined at the level of 3-digit ISCO codes. Log wages are used. The 
figure was prepared using locally weighted regression.
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Finally, let us consider how the presence of the large occupational groups changed 
on the labour market. The green bars in Figure 7 show the changes in employment 
shares in the 1990s, while the blue bars show the changes in the 2000s among 
service workers, skilled labourers, retail staff, office staff, high-skilled occupations 
and managers.17 In the 1990s, the share of skilled labourers is shown to have 
increased considerably, whereas the share of office staff and managers decreased. 
This coincides with the appearance of large multinational companies in Hungary, 
a majority of which operate in manufacturing. Conversely, in 2000–2016 there 
was a major increase in the share of high-skilled and service occupations, whereas 
that of skilled labourers dropped, which is consistent with the polarisation of the 
labour market.
Polarisation of employment, therefore, took place in the 2000s, but it was not 
coupled with wage polarization, as wage growth was inversely proportional to 
the initial wage. Hungarian companies used the new production technologies, 
which transformed the composition of occupations: the share of routine jobs 
diminished. However, wages did not reflect the change in demand. In the following, 
an explanation is sought for why labour market polarisation occurred only in 
employment shares and not at the level of wages.
17  The classification of occupation groups by ISCO codes is shown in the notes to the figure.
Figure 7
Change in employment shares by large occupation groups, 1994–2000 and  
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Note: N = 2,757,663. The figure shows the change in the share of large occupation groups on the labour 
market in 1994–2000 and 2000–2016. The occupation groups comprise the following 2-digit ISCO codes: 
low-skilled services (90, 84, 52–53), skilled labourer (70, 81, 82, 83); retail worker (51–52), office staff 
(40), professional (20, 30), manager (10).
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There are two possible mechanisms that influenced wage inequality after 2000. 
One is the rise in the minimum wage, while the other is the expansion in higher 
education. As can be seen in Figure 8, the minimum wage was low relative to 
average earnings in the 1990s (Hungarian Central Statistical Office, website). To 
address this, the government doubled the minimum wage in 2001–2002, after 
which it subsequently fell again relative to the average wage. However, it was 
raised again substantially between 2009 and 2012.18 Comparing the changes in 
the minimum wage to wage growth in Figures 1 and 2, it is clear that the wages of 
the lowest earners increased significantly in these two periods. To see how much 
wages changed in the period when the minimum wage did not increase significantly, 
a wage polarisation figure is prepared for the period when the minimum wage did 
not rise (2002–2011). The wage of low-paying occupations lagged behind average-
earning jobs in that period (Figure 9). Therefore, the considerable increase in the 
minimum wage contributed to the fact that earnings in low-wage occupations grew 
more than earnings in other jobs.
18  The large number of studies that analyse the impact of the minimum wage on employment of the low-skilled 
find mostly zero or a small negative impact (Card – Krueger 1995), although some authors believe that the 
negative effects are not negligible (Neumark et al. 2014). In their analysis of the minimum wage increase 
of 2001–2002 in Hungary, Harasztosi and Lindner (2017) found no negative employment effects. The same 
change was also analysed by Kertesi and Köllő (2003), who, however, did find substantial short-term effects.
Figure 8
Ratio of the minimum wage and the average wage
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Note: The figure shows the proportion of the minimum wage to gross average earnings in percentage 
terms.
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The other process reduced the growth rate of high wages. The expansion in higher 
education in Hungary took place at a very rapid rate and radically changed the share 
of workers on the labour market with a college or university degree. Figure 10 shows 
the proportion of graduates on the labour market, which was 9–10 per cent at the 
beginning of the period studied. This did not change much in the 1990s, but the 
share of graduates doubled after 2000. According to a market model, relative wage 
growth (in this case the wage advantage of skilled workers relative to the unskilled) 
is determined by the size of supply and demand. In the following, we formalise this 
based on the methodology of Autor et al. (1998).
Figure 9
Wage growth, 2002–2011
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Note: N = 2,757,663. The figure shows the average wage growth of occupations between 2002 and 2011, 
as a function of where the average median wage of the occupations fell within the 2002 wage distribu-
tion. Occupations are defined at the level of 3-digit ISCO codes. Log wages are used. The figure was 
prepared using locally weighted regression.
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Two types of workers are used: the skilled (measured by the number of graduates) 
and the unskilled (those with at most a secondary school diploma). We note their 
numbers by N1 and N2, and their average wage by w1 and w2. The relative supply 
of graduates is:
 S = log(N1/N2). (3)
To quantify relative demand, we assume a CES global production function, and the 
two types of workers produce the final product Q:
 Q = [α(A1N1)
 (σ–1)/σ + (1 – α)(A2N2)
(σ–1)/σ] σ/(σ–1) , (4)
where α, A1, A2 are the parameters of the technology used, and σ is the elasticity 
of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers. If technological progress 
does not change the productivity of the two groups of workers, A1/A2 and α are 
stable. If the productivity of skilled workers increases relative to the unskilled, A1/
A2 or α rises.
Assuming that workers’ wage equals their marginal product, the derivative of the 
production function with respect to N1 and N2 yields the relative wage of skilled 
and unskilled workers:
 log(w1/w2) = 1/σ [D – log(N1/N2)], (5)
Figure 10
Expansion of higher education in Hungary
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where log(N1/N2) equals the relative supply of the two worker categories, and 
D is a measure of relative demand, which depends solely on the technological 
parameters A1, A2, σ and α. The greater D is, the larger companies’ relative demand 
for skilled workers. Equation (5) can be used to express relative demand:
 D = log [(w1N1)/(w2N2)] + (σ – 1) log [w1/w2]. (6)
Both the supply in Expression (3) and the demand determined in Expression (6) can 
be calculated based on the data. In line with the literature, σ is attributed a value 
of 1.4, but similar results are derived for other values (e.g. 1 and 2). Table 2 shows 
the calculated relative wages as well as the changes in relative supply and demand 
for five-year periods as well as the 1990s and the 2000s.19 The relative supply of 
skilled workers increased by merely 4.1 per cent relative to those with at most 
a secondary school diploma between 1995 and 2000. However, this trend changed 
in the 2000s when the students that enrolled to colleges and universities after the 
political transition entered the labour market. Relative supply increased by 33 log 
points in the next five-year period. Between 2005 and 2010, the growth rate of 
relative supply diminished somewhat, to 25 log points, and finally, in the last five-
year period, it declined further, to 22 log points.
Demand followed a different path. In the 1990s, the relative demand for skilled 
workers increased dramatically (by 31 log points), however, this rate steadily 
declined in 2000–2015. It increased by 22–24 log points in the first two periods, 
and by 11 in the last.
The comparison of the relative demand and supply shows that relative demand 
grew much more than relative supply in the 1990s. However, after the turn of the 
millennium, the further expansion of demand could not offset the tremendous 
growth in supply, which is reflected in wage dynamics. The graduate wage premium 
spiked between 1995 and 2000 (by 19 log points), but it diminished steadily in the 
subsequent period, mostly when relative supply increased.
The table also presents relative demand and supply figures for the two large periods 
analysed in the previous section. Relative supply stagnated between 1995 and 2000, 
relative demand increased sharply in favour of skilled workers, and the relative wage 
expanded substantially. In 2000–2015, the opposite occurred. The large supply 
growth could not be offset by the increasing demand, which led to a 17-log point 
drop in the graduate wage premium. Over the whole period, the wage premium 
increased by merely 2 log points.
19  The annual data exhibit large volatility, and therefore the amounts in the table equal the average of the 
given year and years directly preceding and following it (“2015” indicates the average of 2014–2016).
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Table 2
Changes in relative supply, relative demand and relative wages
Period Relative supply Relative demand Relative wage
1995–2000 0.041 0.309 0.191
2000–2005 0.325 0.240 –0.061
2005–2010 0.250 0.217 –0.024
2010–2015 0.227 0.105 –0.087
2000–2015 0.803 0.562 –0.172
1995–2015 0.840 0.872 0.019
Note: N = 2,757,663. The table presents the change in the relative supply, demand and wage difference 
between graduates and those working with at most a secondary school diploma for the period shown in 
Column 1. Relative supply equals the log difference between the number of skilled and unskilled workers. 
Relative demand follows from the maximisation of a CES production function, where the inputs are the 
number of skilled and unskilled workers (see Expression [6] in the text). The wage difference equals the 
log difference between the average wage of skilled and unskilled workers. The annual amounts equal 
the average of the given year and the years directly preceding and following it.
5. Conclusions
This study analysed wage inequality in Hungary over the past 20 years. In the 1990s, 
Hungary mirrored the labour market wage changes in the United States ten years 
earlier. This changed in the next decade when the share of the various occupations 
varied as in developed countries: labour market polarisation occurred, i.e. the share 
of low-skilled and high-skilled jobs increased, while the proportion of medium-
skilled jobs dropped. However, wages did not become polarised. The higher the 
wages in an occupation in 2000, the less they increased in the next 15 years. This 
can be attributed to two factors: first, the government raised the minimum wage 
twice during the period, thereby pushing up the earnings of the low-skilled. Second, 
the expansion in higher education in the 1990s, which bore fruit around 2000, 
increased the share of college and university graduates within the labour force, 
which had a negative impact on the graduate wage premium. As a result of the 
substantial increase in inequality in the 1990s and the balancing developments 
of the 2000s, wage inequality was unchanged over the whole period: in 2016 the 
graduate wage premium was close to what it had been in 1994.
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